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  Most DSGE models assume full information and model-consistent expectations. This paper 
relaxes both these assumptions in the context of the stochastic growth model with incomplete 
markets and heterogeneous agents. Households do not have direct knowledge of the structure 
of economy or the values of aggregate quantities; instead they form expectations by learning 
from the prices in their market-consistent information sets. The economy converges quickly 
to  an  equilibrium  which  is  similar  to  the  equilibrium  with  model-consistent  expectations  and 
market-consistent information. Learning does not introduce strong dynamics at the aggregate 
level, though more interesting things happen at the household level. At least in the context of 
this model, assumptions about information seem important for aggregates; assumptions about 
the ability to form model-consistent expectations less so. 
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Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models assume agents can form model-
consistent expectations and have full information. The learning literature relaxes the ￿rst
assumption while typically retaining the second. The imperfect information literature
relaxes the second while retaining the ￿rst. This paper relaxes both of these assumptions,
in the context of the stochastic growth model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous
agents.
Households are assumed to have "market-consistent" information sets (Graham and
Wright, 2010). Incomplete markets will then lead to incomplete information, and with
incomplete markets as in Krusell and Smith (1998) households￿information sets will con-
sist of the wage and the return to capital. To implement consumption, households need
to forecast these prices and, since it is assumed they cannot form model-consistent ex-
pectations, they do so by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) in the prices. Thus
households in this model have no direct knowledge of the structure of the macroeconomy
or the values of aggregate quantities. The model avoids the unrealistic cognitive demands
of model-consistent expectations (which are even less realistic in models of heterogeneous
information such as Nimark, 2007 or Graham and Wright, 2010 in which agents esti-
mating in￿nite hierarchies of expectations), and the strong informational requirements of
full information models. Conditional on their (in general non-model-consistent) beliefs,
households are modelled as rational (Adams and Marcet, 2011, refer to this as "internal
rationality". This is in contrast to the "Euler equation learning" approach in which
agents are modelled as boundedly rational. For a discussion see Evans et al, 2011 or
Graham, 2011).
Given households￿VAR in prices (their "perceived law of motion", PLM), the paper
derives a state space representation of the actual law of motion (ALM) in which the state
is shown to expand to the full history of the economy1. Since households estimate a
￿nite order VAR, any resulting equilibrium must therefore be a restricted perceptions
equilibrium (RPE, in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) and conditions are given
for its stability and learnability.
The properties of the model are then studied numerically. The mechansim by which
learning a⁄ects the economy is more complex than with a representative agent since, in
the stochastic steady state of the model, structural heterogeneity across agents creates
heterogeneity of beliefs.. To understand the impact of learning, a careful consideration of
the steady state distribution of beliefs is necessary and this mechanism is clari￿ed using
a simple univariate example.
The main results are as follows
1There is a close link with the "in￿nite hierarchy of expectations" (Townsend, 1983) that characterizes
models with heterogeneous information sets.
21. The economy converges to the restricted perceptions equilibrium from any stable
prior. Under ordinary least squares learning, a standard theorem can be used to
show that there is
p
t convergence. Under constant gain learning the speed of
convergence depends on the chosen gain.
2. Constant gain learning only has small e⁄ects on the aggregate economy, changing
the volatility of aggregates by at most a few percent from the model-consistent
expectations equilibrium (MCEE). Learning can amplify or mute the e⁄ect of
shocks, depending on the gain.
3. Household - level quantities are much more volatile than at the MCEE. Speci￿cally,
the volatility of household consumption growth is much closer to that found in the
data.
4. If an intercept is included in the learning rule, the aggregate economy becomes so
volatile that it is only stable with very small gains.
The ￿rst result is in contrast to existing studies (for example Carceles-Poveda and
Giannitsarou, 2007) which show convergence is slow in a full information representative
agent model. Graham (2011) shows that fast convergence is a consequence of modelling
households as individually rational as opposed to the "Euler equation learning" approach
(Evans et al, 2011) of bounded individual rationality. The present paper shows that such
fast convergence also occurs with restricted information sets.
The speed of convergence is important for reasons of informational plausibility. To
avoid arbitrary dynamics arising along the convergence path, models with learning are
typically initialized with learning rules that have already converged. If convergence is
slow this becomes a very strong assumption, endowing agents with the knowledge they
are supposed to be learning. If convergence is fast this assumption becomes much more
plausible.
The second result goes against the simple intuition drawn from representative agent
models that constant gain learning, by increasing the volatility of expectations, increases
the volatility of the economy. The economy with learning is characterized by a (stochas-
tic) steady state distribution of beliefs across households. The impact of this distribution
of beliefs on aggregates depends on its shape (in general it will not be symmetrical or
centred on the restricted perceptions equilibrium) and the non-linearity of consumption
to beliefs. The overall e⁄ect on the macroeconomy is modest, with a reduction in the
impact e⁄ect of shocks but an increase in persistence combining to give an increase in
the volatility of aggregates of at most a few percent over the equilibrium with model-
consistent expectations. Higher gains can result in lower volatilities. In practice, given
the data typically available, it would be di¢ cult to distinguish the aggregate economy
with learning from one with model-consistent expectations.
3The combination of the ￿rst two results allows a model-consistent expectations equi-
librium to be interpreted as the outcome of a learning process that has already converged
(Grandmont, 1998, makes this point). However, the equilibrium that the economy con-
verges to is that with market-consistent information, described in Graham and Wright
(2010), which di⁄ers in signi￿cant ways from the equilibrium with full information. At
least in the context of this model, assumptions on information seem important, assump-
tions on the ability of households to form model-consistent expectations less so.
This is particularly striking given that households are making decision under very
limited information. The rules they use to forecast their income are misspeci￿ed in three
ways: they do not know the true law of motion for the economy; they cannot observe
the state variables and whereas the true law of motion will be in￿nite-dimensional they
are restricted to using a ￿nite number of lags. Yet still the economy converges quickly
to an equilibrium that would in practice be hard to distinguish from one in which agents
form model-consistent expectations.
From a modelling point of view, the approach of this paper has a clear advantage.
Papers in the learning literature typically makes assumptions, often tacitly about what
information agents have and how they use it. Some papers assume that agents use
one information set when choosing how much to consume and another when they form
expectations2. Some papers assume that agents only use a subset of the information
at their disposal to form expectations3. Many papers model a representative agent (for
example, Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007 or Milani, 2007, 2011), but need to
then assume that the agent does not realize that solving for their own consumption is the
same as solving for the law of motion of the economy as a whole4. Other examples can
be found throughout the learning literature. Such assumptions may be perfectly valid,
but they make it hard to identify the extent to which results are due to these speci￿c
informational assumptions and the extent to which they are due to the central issue of
the learning literature - the inability of agents to form model-speci￿c expectations. This
paper avoids such assumptions by on the one hand modelling heterogeneity explicitly and
on the other by simply assuming that households know nothing about the macroeconomy
apart from their market-consistent information sets.
Excellent overviews of the literature on imperfect information and learning can be
found in Hellwig (2006) and Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) respectively. Al-
though most learning models consider a representative agent, there is a growing literature
on learning with heterogeneity. The bulk of this literature, for example Giannitsarou
2 Fout and Francis (2011) study this issue and coin the term "information-consistent learning".
3An example of this is Evans et al (2009) which assumes agents forecast interest rates using information
only on lagged interest rates.
4Justifying this approach by assuming an economy with many identical agents who do not know
they are identical again involves an arti￿cial restriction - that agents do not run a simple regression of
individual quantities on aggregates which would immediately reveal a perfect correlation.
4(2003), Branch and McGough (2004) or Branch and Evans (2006) address the problem
of heterogeneity in learning rules or initial conditions. An exception is Honkapohja and
Mitra (2006) which addresses a general model with both learning and structural hetero-
geneity, which under full information, would nest the model in this paper. However
under imperfect information this is not the case and this paper extends the techniques
introduced by Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) to an economy with incomplete and hetero-
geneous information sets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 states the PLM, derives the ALM and gives stability conditions. Section 4
investigates the convergence properties of the model under ordinary least squares learning
and section 5 studies the economy under constant gain learning. Section 6 concludes.
Derivations and proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
This section presents a model of the type that is becoming standard in the dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium literature5. There are a large number of households and a large number of
￿rms, divided across S islands. There are shocks to aggregate and island-speci￿c labour
productivity. Markets are incomplete in the sense that there are no swaps, only markets
for capital and labour. Since the model is standard, only the linearised constraints and
optimality conditions are presented here6. More workings are in Appendix A.1.
2.1 Households
A typical household on island s consumes (cs
t) and rents capital (ks
t) and labour (hs
t)
to ￿rms. Household labour on each island has idiosyncratic productivity (zs
t) whereas
capital is homogenous, so households earn the aggregate gross return (rkt) on capital
but an idiosyncratic wage (ws
t) on their labour. Households on di⁄erent islands are
unconditionally identical.





t+1 = ￿ ~ E
s
trt+1 (1)
where rt is the net return to capital (related to the gross return by rkt = rt+(1 ￿ ￿)) and
￿ the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The expectations operator for household s, with
5Examples of papers which use similar models include Krusell and Smith (1998), Graham and Wright
(2010) and Lorenzoni (2010).
6The linear model presented here can be thought of as a ￿rst-order approximation to a non-linear
model (for details of the linearisation see Graham and Wright, 2010). However since the focus of this
paper is on learning and as is conventional only linear learning rules are investigated, it may be better
simply to think of the model as linear per se.
5a tilde since in the general case individuals will have non-model-consistent expectations,
is de￿ned as the expectation given the household￿ s information set ￿s
t, i.e. for some
variable at ~ Es
tat = ~ Eatj￿s
t.











where n is steady-state labour and 1
￿ the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply. House-
hold capital evolves according to
k
s






















t) + (1 ￿ ￿)(rkt + k
s
t) (4)
where ￿ is the labour share and c
y is the steady-state consumption share of output. The
left-hand side shows spending on consumption and investment weighted by their steady-
state shares of output. The right-hand side shows income from renting labour and capital
to ￿rms weighted by their factor shares.
2.2 Firms
A typical ￿rm on island s faces a production function
y
s




t + (1 ￿ ￿)j
s
t (5)
where at is an aggregate productivity shock, zs
t island-speci￿c productivity and js
t is the
capital rented by the ￿rm: in general, js
t 6= ks
t; since capital will ￿ ow to more productive
islands. The ￿rm chooses capital and labour to satisfy ￿rst-order conditions
















Aggregate quantities are sums over household or ￿rm quantities, calculated as quantities










Markets are incomplete in the sense that the only markets are those for output, labour
and capital - there are no swaps which allow idiosyncratic risk to be transferred between
households.
The labour market is segmented in that ￿rms on island s only rent labour from
households on island s, and the wage on island s, ws
t, adjusts to set labour supply (2)
equal to labour demand (7). Appendix A.1.3 shows the relation between the idiosyncratic
wage and the aggregate wage is:
w
s
t = wt + z
s
t (9)
Recall that in the general case no household will be able to observe wt or zs
t.
In contrast, capital is homogenous and tradeable between islands, so ￿ ows to islands
with more productive labour. The gross return, rt, adjusts to make the aggregate
demand for capital from ￿rms consistent with each household￿ s Euler equation (1) and
the aggregate budget constraint.
Market clearing prices (in the general case no household in the model could calculate
these) are given by
wt = ￿wkkt + ￿waat + ￿wcct (10)
rt = ￿rkkt + ￿raat + ￿rcct (11)
where expressions for the coe¢ cients are given in Appendix A.2. Note in the case of
￿xed labour supply (￿ ! 1), ￿wc = ￿rc = 0.
2.5 Shocks
For both the aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks, assume autoregressive
processes








where "t and "s















t = 0: (14)
72.6 Information
De￿nition 1. (Full information) Full information for a typical household on island s,
denoted by an information set ￿s￿









Graham and Wright (2010) argues that in a decentralized equilibrium the states will
not in general be known by agents, so the assumption of full information is a strong one.
Instead that paper proposes the following de￿nition of an information set consistent with
a decentralized equilibrium, reproduced here:
De￿nition 2. (Market-consistent information) Households￿information sets con-
sists of the prices in the markets in which they participate.
With only capital and labour markets the market-consistent information set of a



























De￿nition 3. Equilibrium with market-consistent information: a competitive
equilibrium in which the law of motion of the economy is consistent with each agent solving











1. Given prices and informational restrictions, the allocations solve the utility maxi-




t=1:1 are the marginal products of aggregate capital and island-speci￿c labour.
3. All markets clear










however, since each of these histories embodies the household￿ s own responses to the evolution of ￿s
t; it
contains no information not already in ￿s
t.
82.8 Benchmark cases
The above model nests four familiar cases. With complete markets, the market-consistent
information set is invertible (in the sense of Baxter et al, 2011) and full information is
revealed (the result of Radner, 1979). All idiosyncratic risk is diversi￿ed away and the
model is identical to the representative agent real business cycle model.
With incomplete markets and assumed full information, the path of the aggregate
economy is identical to the complete markets case. This is related to Krusell and Smith￿ s
(1998) result that an economy with incomplete markets can closely resemble one with
complete markets - the resemblance is exact in the model because it is linear. However
the economy di⁄ers markedly at a household level since household wealth follows a unit
root process.
With complete markets and learning, the model is the real business cycle model with
learning, though it di⁄ers from most standard treatments (e.g. Carceles-Poveda and
Giannitsarou) in that households are assumed to have in￿nite horizons (see Evans et al,
2011; and Graham, 2011 for further discussion of this issue).
With market-consistent information and model-consistent expectations, the model is
that studied in Graham and Wright (2010). Since this represents the limit to which
a model with learning might converge, it is worth reviewing its properties. Market-
consistent information implies heterogeneity of information across households, so to form
model-consistent expectations households need to estimate an in￿nite hierarchy of expec-
tations. Numerically, this leads to the properties of the model looking quite di⁄erent from
under full information, notably the sign of the impact response of aggregate consumption
to an aggregate technology shock reverses. This is discussed further in section 3.6.
2.9 Optimal consumption
To solve for optimal consumption, substitute the budget constraint (4) into the capital
evolution equation (3), solve forward and use the transversality condition on capital to
give an expression relating the path of future consumption to current capital, current

























where the constants are de￿ned (along with a full derivation) in Appendix A.3. Iterate



































where 1 + r = 1
















The ￿rst term shows how consumption depends on current wealth consisting of capital,
and income from labour and capital (the constants pick up the fact that quantities are
substituted out). The second term shows how consumption depends on expected future




the familiar propensity to consume out of wealth - the constant scales linearised capital
to consumption.
2.10 Calibration
The benchmark calibration follows Graham and Wright (2010). Values for most of the
parameters are chosen following Campbell (1994): ￿ = 1, ￿ = 0:025, ￿ = 0:6, ￿ = 0:99,
n = 0:2. The intertemporal elasticity of labour supply 1
￿ is chosen to be 5. The aggregate
productivity shock is given the benchmark RBC values, ￿a = 0:9; ￿a = 0:7% per quarter.
Graham and Wright (2010) uses empirical estimates of labour income process to calibrate
the idiosyncratic shock ￿z = 0:9, ￿z = 5￿a.
3 Market-consistent information and learning
This section studies the case of learning from a market-consistent information set, which,
with incomplete markets, will consist of the aggregate return on capital and the island-
speci￿c wage. A perceived law of motion (PLM) is ￿rst de￿ned, then, conditional on the
PLM, an expression is derived for the actual law of motion (ALM). It is shown that in
general the state space of the ALM will expand to the history of the economy. Finally,
a condition for e-stability is given
3.1 The perceived law of motion
Assume households estimate a VAR in the prices in their market-consistent information
set, then use this estimated process to forecast future prices. The perceived law of motion







t￿1 + $it (21)
where ￿
s
t, a polynomial of order l in the lag operator L, is
t is the measurement vector
de￿ned in (15) and $it is the estimation error.8








which pick out the return and the
wage respectively from the measurement vector, then
~ E
s



































￿ci = (￿3Tw + ￿5Tr)￿￿
s (I ￿ ￿￿
s)
￿1 (25)
3.2 The actual law of motion
To derive the actual law of motion for the economy individual consumption and labour
supply must be aggregated. It is important to note that no household in the economy
has su¢ cient knowledge, either in terms of the structure of the economy or information
about other households, to do this (this is the same as saying households are unable to
form model-consistent expectations). What follows is from the modeler￿ s perspective.
Firstly, following Honkapohja and Mitra (2006), stack the PLMs for all households in
the economy to give



















Then sum (24) across households and substitute for market clearing prices from (10)
and (11) to give an expression for aggregate consumption







is the current vector of states and ￿t, de￿ned in (26)
stacks the PLMs for all households. Note that aggregate consumption is independent
of the wealth distribution - this is related to Krusell and Smith￿ s (1998) ￿nding that the
8As in full-information learning (Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2008) circularity is avoided by
assuming that to form estimates at time t the agents use only information from t ￿ 1 and earlier.
11wealth distribution only has a small e⁄ects on the dynamics of the model. There is no
e⁄ect at all here because of the linearity of the model.
Given states, lagged prices, last period￿ s perceived law of motion ￿t￿1 and a knowledge
of the current state vector (27) is su¢ cient to solve for aggregate consumption and hence
all other aggregate and idiosyncratic quantities.
3.3 A state space representation
From (27) aggregate consumption depends on lagged prices; and from (10) and (11),
lagged prices depend on lagged aggregate consumption. So repeatedly substituting shows
that current consumption depends on the full history of consumption. In other words,
the state space expands to the full history of the economy. Writing the full state vector
as a stack of the current state vectors Yt
Xt =
h
Yt Yt￿1 ::: Y0
i0
(28)








The law of motion for the full state vector is then found by substituting into the
law of motion for the non-expectational states and stacking this on top of the exogenous














is a vector of innovations. This assumes there is an initial
period with ￿0;X0 exogenously given. For a detailed derivation see Appendix A.4.
The expansion of the state space is a normal feature of models with heterogeneous
information across agents. With model-consistent expectations, it is usually formu-
lated as a hierarchy of average expectations of the current state vector (Townsend, 1983,
Woodford, 2003, Nimark, 2007). However there is always an equivalent representation
in terms of lags of the non-expectational state vector (Lorenzoni, 2010, Mackowiak and
Wiederholt, 2009), analogous to the representation derived here.
Proposition 1. Special cases (a) If labour supply is constant (lim ￿ ! 1) the state
vector comprises l lags of the current state vector state Yt. (b) If there is a single lag in
the PLM (l = 1) the state vector comprises the current state vector Yt.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Part (b) of the proposition is related to the result of Graham and Wright (2010) that
12in an economy with model-consistent expectations the hierarchy of expectations collapses
in the limiting cases of perfect heterogeneity (￿z ! 1) and perfect homogeneity (￿z = 0)
and in this case the economy evolves according to a ￿rst-order autoregressive process.
Expressions for the observable prices in terms of the state vector can be found by








This is the actual law of motion (ALM) for the observables.
3.4 Learning rules





































t=0 is the gain sequence which needs to satisfy standard conditions. The paper
studies two gain sequences, ordinary least squares learning, with ￿t = t￿1 and constant
gain learning, with ￿t = ￿. Such rules for each household can be stacked on top of each
other to give a learning rule for ￿ of the form
￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿tH(￿t;It) (34)
3.5 E-stability and learnability
The standard analysis of the stability of economies under learning is given in Evans
and Honkapohja (2001). Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) extend this to a model with
both structural and learning heterogeneity. This section draws on these techniques
to an economy with heterogeneous and incomplete information sets. Conditions for




= h(￿);where h(￿) = lim
t!1EH(￿;Xt) (35)
The economy with learning will converge to ￿ only if ￿ is a locally stable ￿xed point of
the associated ODE.
The state-space representation allows an expression to be derived for H. First express
H in terms of lagged states and innovations by substituting for prices from (31) then for
13current states from (30) so (34) can be rewritten as




















t = MX, EXtW 0
t = 0. For a detailed derivation see Appendix A.5.
An equilibrium is a zero of h(￿). It is e-stable and learnable if the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian of h(￿) have real parts which are negative.
3.6 The nature of the equilibrium
Proposition 2. Except in the cases of proposition 1 an equilibrium under learning must be
a restricted-perceptions equilibrium in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p320)9.
Proof. In general, the PLM (21) depends on some limited history of the observables,
whereas the ALM (31) depends on the full history.





















Table 1 shows the coe¢ cients of the PLM for di⁄erent lag lengths at the restricted
perceptions equilibrium, i.e. the elements of the ￿ which is a zero of (37), along with the
PLM under model-consistent expectations. PLMs at all lag lengths are characterized by
strong ￿rst-order autoregressive components. As the number of lags increases, the PLM
approaches the true law of motion at the MCEE.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
How di⁄erent are the properties of the economy at the restricted-perceptions equilib-
rium from the model-consistent equilibrium10? To study the equilibrium, ￿rst "switch
o⁄" learning and ￿x the beliefs of all households at their value at the restricted-perceptions
equilibrium (this can be thought of as the non-stochastic steady state of the economy, in
9See also Branch (2004).
10The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that the MCEE can only be solved approxi-
mately by truncating the hierarchy of expectations. However Graham and Wright (2010) shows that in
practice the weight on orders of the hierarchy declines quickly so an solution to machine precision can
be found, at least for the calibration used here.
14contrast to the stochastic steady state in which there is a non-degenerate distribution of
beliefs, discussed in section 5.2).
As with all RBC-type models, the main driver of the response of the economy is the
behaviour of consumption, so begin by considering that.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 shows the impulse response of consumption to an aggregate productivity
shock at the MCEE and at the RPE with 1 lag in the PLM. First note that under model-
consistent expectations the impact e⁄ect of the positive technology shock on consumption
is negative. This contrast with the full information response is one of the results of
Graham and Wright (2010). A full discussion can be found there but brief intuition
is as follows. With market-consistent information sets, households do not observe the
aggregate technology shock directly, but instead see its e⁄ect as a positive innovation to
both the wage and the return to capital. Consider the response to the latter signal.
An unexpected increase in the return could either be caused by a positive productivity
shock, or because the household overestimated aggregate capital in the previous period.
The certainty equivalent response to the ￿rst is to increase consumption, to the second to
reduce consumption. Graham and Wright (2010) shows under all plausible calibrations
the latter e⁄ect dominates so the impact response of consumption is negative.
Another way of putting this is, even with model-consistent expectations, households￿
limited information sets mean they make predictable (from the modeler￿ s point of view)
forecast errors in response to the technology shocks (though the forecast errors are white
noise conditional on households￿information sets). Turning to the restricted perceptions
equilibrium, households make larger forecast errors (since their PLM is misspeci￿ed) and
so consumption responds by more on impact. These bigger forecast errors mean bigger
positive income surprises in subsequent periods so consumption rises above its value at
the MCEE after a few periods then falls back to the steady state. It is possible to show
numerically that welfare is unambiguously lower at the RPE.
Table 2 shows a number of statistics comparing the economy with households￿PLMs
￿xed at the RPE with various lag lengths to the economy with model-consistent expecta-
tions. First note the modest magnitude of the misspeci￿cation - aggregate consumption
is 2% and output 3:5% more volatile in the case with 1 lag in the PLM than in the econ-
omy with model-consistent expectations. Also note that as the number of lags increases
the volatility falls towards its value at the MCEE.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
One further point: the RPE will depend on the choice of the number of households
in the economy. To see this, consider a shock to a single household￿ s idiosyncratic
15productivity. With many households, the impact on the aggregate economy will be
small and its main a⁄ect on the learning rule will be in updating the elements of ￿
s
t
which relate to the idiosyncratic wage ws
t. With fewer households, the impact on the
aggregate economy will increase so will also lead to the updating of elements of ￿
s
t which
relate to the aggregate return r. This can have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the properties
of the economy so the number of households needs to be chosen to be su¢ ciently high.
Another, more interesting, way in which the equilibria with learning will depend on the
number of households is discussed in section 5.5.
3.7 Projection
The consumption function (24) is well de￿ned as long as I ￿￿￿
s
t is invertible. Since this
term comes from computing the discounted sum of the expected future path of prices,
the invertibility condition is the same as requiring the sum to be bounded. This is
summarised in the following de￿nition
De￿nition 4. (stable PLM):A given ￿
s is stable if it results in consumption being bounded.
This will be the case if the eigenvalues of ￿
s
t are less than ￿
￿1 > 1 in absolute value.
Theorem 4 of Ljung (1977, p. 557), which forms the basis of many convergence
results in the learning literature employs a "projection facility" constraining estimates
to remain in a region around the REE. This has been widely criticized (e.g. Grandmont
and Laroque, 1991 and Grandmont, 1998) since it involves endowing households with
knowledge of what they are supposed to be learning. Even though a projection facility
has been shown not to be necessary to proofs of convergence and stability in models with
a unique REE (Bray and Savin, 1986) or more generally (Evans and Honkapohja, 1998),
it is crucial for any numerical implementation of learning. To see this note that with a
non-zero gain there is always a ￿nite probability that particular sequence of shocks will
lead to a household estimating a PLM that is unstable in the sense of de￿nition 4, leading
forecasts to grow without limit and consumption to be unde￿ned.
The form of the consumption function (24) gives a natural way to de￿ne a projection
algorithm which escapes the critiques of Grandmont and Laroque.
De￿nition 5. (projection facility):After estimating the PLM households check the eigen-
values of ￿
s
t. If they are greater than q the household discards the estimated ￿
s
t and
chooses a di⁄erent one.
If the projection facility is used there are many ways to pick a ￿
s
t which do not involve
endowing households with knowledge of the RPE. The simplest way is to use the value
16from the previous period11,12.
In the remainder of the paper, q is taken to be unity which can be interpreted as
endowing households with the knowledge that the macroeconomy is stationary. There
are two justi￿cations for this. Firstly, estimating a VAR of the form (21) is problematic
with non-stationary variables. Secondly, the consumption function is strongly non-linear
for PLMs with eigenvalues greater than unity (recall that as eig (￿
s) ! ￿
￿1;cs ! +1)
and allowing beliefs to enter this range means arbitrary amounts of volatility can be
generated in the macroeconomy.
Projection is rarely discussed in the context of numerical analysis. Williams (2003)
and Eusepi and Preston (2011) both mention they discard explosive values though it
is not clear if this includes rational bubble paths, and in the latter paper at least the
extremely small gains used means that such paths will be very rare events. With "Euler
equation learning" (Evans et al, 2011), there is no in￿nite forward sum in the consumption
function so the issue does not arise although Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007,
p2673) explicitly exclude non-stationary paths.
4 Ordinary least squares learning
This section investigates the convergence properties of the model under ordinary least
squares (OLS)13. Why does convergence matter? When studying the properties of
models with learning they are usually initialized with PLMs at the MCEE (or RPE,
if appropriate). This avoids transitional dynamics, governed by an arbitrary choice of
prior, a⁄ecting the results. However without fast convergence this is informationally
implausible - households are being endowed with what the nature of learning models
assumes they are unable to calculate.
First, consider the benchmark case of full information. Convergence with ordinary
least squares learning is typically found to be slow. To illustrate this take the represen-
tative household RBC model of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) or Carceles-Poveda and
Giannitsarou (2007). In such a model, the perceived law of motion is
kt+1 = ￿kkkt + ￿aaat (40)
11Other possibilities are to pick one from a random household; to use the average across households
etc. As long as the number of households is su¢ ciently large, the choice makes no di⁄erence to the
properties of the economy.
12From a Bayesian perspective, projection is equivalent to having a truncated prior. When a draw
triggers the projection facility, the response of a Bayesian would be to move the posterior in the direction
of the non-stationary solution rather than simply ignoring the information. In practice, the method of
choosing the ￿projected￿value makes no di⁄erence to the properties of the model as long as there are
enough agents.
13Since under OLS the gain tends to zero as time passes, it is rarely used to study business cycle
dynamics, but remains an important benchmark case.
17and ￿gure 2 shows the convergence of ￿kk starting from a prior of 0:5 of its value at the
MCEE. Even after 10,000 periods, the parameter is a long way from its value at the
MCEE.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Turning to the model of this paper, take the benchmark calibration with one lag in
the perceived law of motion (l = 1)14. Choose a prior to be very di⁄erent from the RPE,
for example one drawn across households from N (0:3;0:1). This choice is of course
arbitrary, but a choice needs to be made if ￿gures are to be shown.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Figure 3 shows the convergence of this economy in terms of deviation along the con-
vergence path of the elements of the average PLM from their value at the RPE. The
lines are the average values across 10;000 runs of the model; 95% of these runs lie in
the shaded areas. Convergence is remarkably fast when compared with the standard
case of ￿gure 2 (note the ￿gures have di⁄erent scales) with all elements of the PLM close
to their value at the RPE within a few hundred periods. Graham (2011) shows (in a
full-information model) that this is a consequence of modelling households as having in￿-
nite forecast horizons in contrast to the "Euler equation learning" of the standard model.
The intuition for this is that individual rationality leads to behaviour away from the RPE




Theorem 3 of Benveniste et al (1990, p110)16 studies a system of the form of (26) and (30)
under OLS learning (￿t = t￿1). It states that if the derivative of h(￿) = EH(￿;Xt)




D ! N (0;P) (41)
where the matrix P satis￿es the Lyapunov equation
[I=2 + h￿ (￿





0 = 0 (42)
14Using more lags makes no signi￿cant di⁄erence to the results.
15Another interesting feature is the "notch" in the con￿dence interval for ￿ww. This shows that
when the PLM is far from the RPE its properties is dominated by the (mostly aggregate) transitional
dynamics so the distribution across agents remains narrow. When the PLM is close to the RPE, this
strong aggregate component fades and the distribution is dominated by idiosyncratic variation across
households.
16Also used by Marcet and Sargent (1995) and Ferrero (2007).
18As pointed out by Marcet and Sargent (1995), this means that if the conditions are satis-
￿ed, there is root - t convergence, although the formula for the variance of the estimators
is modi￿ed from the classical case. As the eigenvalues become larger, convergence is
slower in the sense that the variance covariance matrix of the limiting distribution P is
larger.
In the RBC case discussed in the previous section, the eigenvalues are ￿0:074 and
￿0:042, too large to apply the theorem. In the model of this paper, no analytical
expression is available for the eigenvalues so they were calculated numerically. For the
baseline calibration, the eigenvalues lie in the range [￿1:26;￿1:00] so the condition of
Benveniste et al (1990) is satis￿ed and convergence is at the rate root-t or faster. The
eigenvalues were then calculated for around 30,000 calibrations17 and across all of these
the upper bound of the eigenvalues was found to be ￿1. So root-t convergence appears
to be a robust property of this model.
5 Constant gain learning
Constant gain learning is often used to study business cycle dynamics since it captures
the idea that learning is perpetual and allows households to respond to changes in the
structure of the economy. The gain parameter can be chosen in various ways. Milani
(2007, 2009) estimates it along with the other parameters of the model. Eusepi and
Preston (2011) use survey data. Evans and Ramey (2006) allow households to choose
it optimally. This paper will study gain parameters in the range [0:001 0:05] which
encompasses all the values commonly used. A baseline value of 0:01 is chosen.
A simple way to interpret the gain is by noting that the weight on the forecast error
from ￿ periods ago relative to the weight from the most recent forecast error is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)
s. So a gain of 0:02 (as estimated in Milani, 2007) implies data from around 34
quarters ago is given approximately half the weight of current data. On the other hand,
a gain of 0:002 (the baseline value of Eusepi and Preston, 2011) means households put
half as much weight on data from 84 years ago as they do on current data.
5.1 Convergence
The economy with constant gain converges to a stationary distribution of beliefs (see
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, p162, for conditions under which such convergence will
occur), the properties of the distribution depending on the size of the gain and the
stochastic properties of the model. As the gain increases, convergence will generally
17The ranges were chosen to encompass values commonly used in the literature. The grid was not par-
ticularly ￿ne, but experimentation showed no evidence of any non-linear e⁄ects. ￿ 2 [0:01;0:025;0:10];￿
2 [0:4;0:6;0:8];; ￿ 2 [0:96;0:99;0:999]; ￿ 2 [0;0:2;1;1]; ￿a 2 0:7;0:9;0:95 ,0:99]; ￿a 2 [0:5;0:7;1];
￿z 2 [0:7;0:9;0:95;0:99]; ￿z 2 [0;1;3:5;5;7;10]. The bold ￿gure represents the baseline calibration.
19be faster and ￿gure 4 shows this for a single component of the PLM, ￿ww. There are a
number of interesting aspects to this ￿gure. Firstly, with low gains the economy takes an
extremely long time to converge to the RPE. Secondly, as the gain increases the economy
seems to converge to a PLM with a mean lower than at the RPE. Thirdly, the economy
converges to a limiting distribution, and the variance of this distribution increases with
the gain. The properties of the distribution is investigated in more detail in section 5.2.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
5.2 The steady state distribution of beliefs
In a representative household model, the intuition for how constant gain learning a⁄ects
the economy seems straightforward. Compared to the model-consistent expectations
equilibrium, learning makes the representative household￿ s expectations more volatile and
this volatility of expectations translates into higher volatility of aggregates. However,
Graham (2011) shows that this intuition only goes through in special cases and the
distribution of beliefs across time must be taken into account. In a heterogeneous agent
model, things are more complicated still since the stochastic steady state of the economy
is now characterized by a distribution across households of their beliefs. In other words,
while in the representative agent case the distribution of beliefs is a time-series, with
heterogeneous households it is also a cross section. The next section describes this
distribution.
Figure 5 shows the steady state distribution of beliefs for various values of the gain
parameter. With one lag in the PLM (and for the rest of the section I shall use this
speci￿cation) the PLM is represented by the 4 elements of ￿. It is important to remember
that the distributions in the ￿gure are for each element of ￿ taken alone, whereas in fact
they are jointly distributed.
The ￿gure shows three interesting features. As the gain parameter increases the
means of the distributions (particularly of the AR coe¢ cients ￿ww and ￿rr) fall; the stan-
dard deviations of the distributions increase and they become more asymmetrical with
a long leftward tail and a short rightward tail. This is a consequence of projection (see
section 3.7). Realizations of ￿ on the right-hand side of the distributions ,which corre-
spond to non-stationary paths of expected prices, will be discarded, so the distributions
are truncated.
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
Table 3 shows the moments of a distribution ￿tted to the steady state distribution
of each element of the PLM. This con￿rms the impression from ￿gure 5: as the gain
increases the mean of the distribution falls; and both its standard deviation and skewness
increase. Again remember that the elements of ￿ are in fact jointly distributed
20[TABLE 3 HERE]
A further feature is shown by table 3. The mean of the distribution is lower than
the MCEE even for very small gains in which the projection facility is not invoked. To
understand this and to clarify the impact of the distribution on aggregates, consider a
simple example.
5.3 A simple example
To understand the e⁄ect of a stationary distribution of beliefs on the macroeconomy, it
is helpful to consider a simple univariate example18 in which capital and labour are ￿xed
and income follow an exogenous AR(1) process:
yt = ￿yt￿1 + "t (43)
Beliefs are parametrized by a scalar ￿ such that
~ Etyt+i = ￿
iyt (44)





(1 + r)bt +
1




where bt is current wealth and the second term represents expectations about future in-
come. Note the ￿rst and second derivatives to ￿ of the second term are positive capturing
the positive and increasing e⁄ect of income persistence on consumption. Although only
the in￿nite forecast horizon case will be considered here, the second derivative of f is
positive as long as T > 0.
When beliefs are model-consistent, i.e. ￿t = ￿ 8t consumption will be a random walk







1 ￿ ￿(1 + r)
￿1￿" (46)
Beliefs are updated by a simpli￿ed constant gain learning algorithm
￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿ (yt ￿ ￿tyt￿1) (47)
How does the stationary distribution of ￿ a⁄ect the economy? Firstly, assume that
the distribution has a mean of ￿ (the value of beliefs at the MCEE); non-zero standard
18Full details are in Appendix B.
21deviation and is symmetric. To understand the impact of this distribution on the un-
conditional properties of consumption consider the response of consumption to a positive
innovation to income. Taking ￿ = 0:9, ￿gure 6 shows the response in the three cases of
￿0 = ￿
￿ = ￿; ￿0 = 0:95 > ￿ and ￿0 = 0:85 < ￿.
[FIGURE 6 HERE]
5.3.1 Case 1: ￿ = ￿
If households￿beliefs are correct, then the impact response of consumption will be exactly
that at the MCEE. In the second period, beliefs will be revised upwards. This will mean
consumption in period 2 is higher than it would be in at MCEE since households believe
income will be more persistent than it actually is. In the third period, there are two
e⁄ects. Firstly, beliefs will be revised downward towards the MCEE. Secondly, household
wealth will be lower than expected. Both of these tend to reduce consumption. As time
passes, these two e⁄ects continue, and at some point consumption will fall below its
value at the MCEE and remain there for the rest of history (as is required to satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint).
To summarise, learning has no impact e⁄ect but causes consumption to rise above
its value at the MCEE for a number of periods after the initial one, then fall below this
value for the rest of time.
Proposition 3. If beliefs are initialized at the MCEE, the impulse response function with
learning implies a higher volatility of consumption growth than without learning
Proof. See Appendix B.1
5.3.2 Case 2: ￿ > ￿
In this case households believe that income is more persistent that it is at the MCEE so
on impact increase their consumption by more than with correct beliefs. In subsequent
periods there are two e⁄ects. Firstly, households wealth will be lower than expected
which will tend to reduce consumption. Secondly, beliefs will be revised, in the second
period upward and in subsequent periods downward back towards the MCEE. In the
second period the second e⁄ect dominates so consumption increases further, in subsequent
periods both e⁄ects go in the same direction and as time passes, consumption will fall
below its value at the MCEE and stay there for the rest of time. So the overall e⁄ect is
higher consumption than at the MCEE for some initial periods, then consumption lower
than at the MCEE for the rest of time.
225.3.3 Case 3: ￿ < ￿
The intuition for this case is simply the mirror image of that with ￿ > ￿. However
note the di⁄erence in magnitude. Since the derivative of the consumption function is
increasing in ￿, the response is much smaller to a lower value of ￿ than to the higher one
of the previous section.
Given these three cases, the unconditional properties of consumption will be the aver-
age of the three cases weighted by the stationary distribution of ￿. Since the distribution
is assumed to be symmetric, the larger impact of case 2 will dominate the smaller one of
case 3 and the volatility of consumption will increase.
So the distribution of beliefs will unambiguously increase the volatility of consumption.
The higher the gain, the higher will be the standard deviation of beliefs so the higher will
be the standard deviation of consumption.
There is a further e⁄ect. The theorem of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) that states
the mean of the distribution will be at the MCEE only holds for small values of the gain.
In practice, the mean will often be di⁄erent from the MCEE. Since the distribution of
beliefs causes the mean response of consumption to be di⁄erent from that at the MCEE,
the response of capital will also be di⁄erent (if consumption responds by more capital
would be expected to be less persistent) and hence the mean ALM will be di⁄erent from
the MCEE. So the mean of the distribution will be di⁄erent from the MCEE, in this
case lower.
How do the properties of consumption change if the mean of the distribution is lower
than at the MCEE (either for the reason given in the previous paragraph or due to the
projection facility, as will be discussed in the next section)? If the mean is lower, draws
of ￿ from case 3 are more likely than those from case 2, and if the it is su¢ ciently low
this will result in the standard deviation of consumption falling below its value at the
MCEE. Similarly, if the distribution is su¢ ciently skewed to the left this will result in
the standard deviation of consumption falling.
To summarise, this simple example suggests that the stationary distribution of beliefs
will have the following e⁄ects:
1. If it is symmetrical, the non-linearity of consumption to beliefs will mean consump-
tion responds by more on impact and be more volatile. This will imply the mean
of the distribution is slightly lower than at the MCEE.
2. If the mean of the distribution is lower, this will o⁄set the e⁄ects in (1) and make
consumption respond by less on impact and be less volatile
3. If the distribution is skewed to the left, this will further o⁄set the e⁄ects.
235.4 The aggregate economy
To analyse the properties of the aggregate economy, ￿rst take the gain to be ￿ = 0:01.
Sensitivities to di⁄erent gains will be considered later. Figure 7 shows the impulse
responses of aggregates to a 1% positive innovation in the process for aggregate technol-
ogy19. For each variable three lines are plotted. The heavy line is the response of the
model with learning, starting from the steady state distribution of beliefs. The dashed
line is the response of the model at the RPE (i.e. with all household beliefs ￿xed at
the RPE). The light line is the response of the model at the mean of the steady state
distribution (i.e. with all household beliefs ￿xed at the mean).
[FIGURE 7 HERE]
Start by considering the ￿rst panel of the ￿gure, the response of aggregate consump-
tion. First compare the heavy line with the dashed line to see that the impact response
of consumption is smaller in magnitude with learning than at the RPE, in other words
learning mutes the impact of the shock. To understand this, recall the three e⁄ects of
beliefs on consumption described in the previous section. Since the mean of the dis-
tribution is lower than at the RPE (or in other words households expect the shock to
have less persistent e⁄ects on prices than it actually does), households respond as if the
shock were less persistent and this reduces its impact. The combination of the second
and third e⁄ects could go in either direction - increasing the impact if the nonlinearity
dominates, or reducing it if skewness dominates. To show the magnitude of these e⁄ects,
the light line on the ￿gure shows the response if all beliefs were ￿xed at the mean of the
distribution. The gap between the light line and the heavy line shows that the combined
e⁄ect of skewness and non-linearity works to o⁄set the e⁄ect of the lower mean.
In subsequent periods, two things happen. Firstly households get unexpected factor
income (since prices are more persistent than they on average expected); secondly house-
holds update their PLMs so the entire distribution of beliefs shift. In practice, this last
e⁄ect is too small to see on the ￿gure, in the second period the di⁄erence between the
path of consumption with a gain of 0:01 and that with no learning (a gain of 0) is of the
order of 10￿3. The e⁄ect is so small because the idiosyncratic volatility is so much more
volatile than the aggregate so aggregate shocks get a small weight in the updating rule
(32). This is in contrast to representative agent models (Graham, 2011 or Eusepi and
Preston 2011) in which impulse response show a pronounced kink in the period after the
shock when beliefs are updated.
This is an important sense in which heterogeneity changes the e⁄ect of learning on
the economy. Since the volatility of aggregate shocks is small compared to that of the
19For clarity, the ￿gures omit to show the distribution of responses of the variables across households.
24idiosyncratic shocks, an innovation in prices due to an aggregate shock only has a small
e⁄ect on households￿beliefs.
The combination of all these e⁄ects means the magnitude of the response of con-
sumption is smaller than at the RPE for the ￿rst 60 periods or so from the impact of the
shock. After this (just o⁄ the right-hand side of the ￿gure) consumption with learning
stays above that at the RPE as both adjust back to the steady state.
To summarise, learning mutes the response of consumption on impact but makes the
response more persistent. Other variables show similar qualitative patterns.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
Table 4 shows how the standard deviations of aggregate variables to their values at
the RPE change with the gain. Looking ￿rst down the columns of the table there is
evidence of non-linearity with respect to the gain - the standard deviations of variables
￿rst increases then, for gains above 0:01 starts to decrease. As the gain increases, the
distribution becomes more skewed with less mass at very persistent values of beliefs, so
the skewness e⁄ect starts to dominate the non-linearity e⁄ect, reducing the impact of
the shock still further. Across all gains, the standard deviation of never more than 1%
higher than at the RPE, and falls to a 2% lower at higher gains. Again, therefore, the
simple intuition that learning increases volatility does not go through to this model, but
more important than the sign of the changes is how modest they are, particularly given
how little information households are using to form forecasts. In practice the economy
with learning would be indistinguishable from one with model-consistent expectations,
at least to an econometrician subject to the typical limits on macroeconomic data.
However, recall that the model-consistent expectations equilibrium which the economy
with learning resembles is that with market-consistent information of Graham and Wright
(2010) which di⁄ers in signi￿cant ways from the equilibrium with full information. In
other words, assumptions about information have a large e⁄ect on the properties of
aggregates; assumptions on whether households can form model-consistent expectations
seem much less important.
5.5 The idiosyncratic economy
The previous section discussed the response of aggregates. What about household vari-
ables? First recall that household variables are non-stationary since idiosyncratic shocks
are pure permanent income and have a permanent e⁄ect on household wealth and con-
sumption (as is the case at the equilibrium with model-consistent expectations). So one
appropriate measure is the standard deviation of consumption growth (an alternative
would be to use any of the wide range of ￿lters available). Table 5 shows this statistic,
averaged across households, for di⁄erent values of the gain parameter. For low values of
25the gain, the volatility of household consumption is very close to that at the RPE. As
the gain increases, the standard deviation increases to a maximum (at to a gain of 0:01)
of four times that at the RPE.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
This is an appealing feature of the model. At the restricted perceptions equilibrium,
the standard deviation of household consumption growth is 0:51%, much lower than the
2￿3% found in the data (e.g. Attanasio et al, 2002). With a gain of 0:01, this becomes
2:4% per quarter, within the range of observed values. As the gain increases above 0:01,
the volatility of consumption growth falls.
For a particular household, the steady state distribution of beliefs discussed in section
5.2 is a time series distribution: in a period when the PLM represents a persistent path
for expected prices households change their consumption by a large amount. However
some households with such beliefs will receive an idiosyncratic shock which lead them
to increase their consumption, and some will receive an idiosyncratic shock which lead
them to decrease their consumption. Both shocks result in higher volatility of household
consumption, but in aggregate their e⁄ect cancels out to leave the much small aggregate
e⁄ects described in the previous section. This gives a further mechanism in addition to
that described in section 3.6 by which the number of households a⁄ects the dynamics of
the model. If the number of households is small, idiosyncratic volatility will contami-
nate the aggregate economy. As shown in table 6, with a small number of households
e⁄ectively arbitrary amounts of aggregate volatility can be generated20.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
5.6 Sensitivities
While the structural parameters of the model (￿;￿;￿;￿;￿) change the equilibrium, they
do not change the informational problem and so have little e⁄ect on the properties of the
economy with learning relative to the economy with model-consistent expectations. As
discussed in Graham and Wright (2010), it is the properties of the shocks which change
the informational problem in interesting ways, and the same is true of the model with
learning.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
Table 7 shows how the ratio of the standard deviation of aggregate consumption in
the model with learning to its value at the RPE changes with the persistence of the
20This suggests a simple rule of thumb for picking the number of agents to use for simulations. Increase
the number of agents until doubling this number has no e⁄ect on the statistics of interest at the desired
level of accuracy.
26aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks. To understand these results, remember that the
return to capital is an aggregate object and so its persistence is largely determined by
the persistence of the aggregate shock. In contrast, because the idiosyncratic shock is
much more volatile than the aggregate, the persistence of the household wage is largely
determined by the persistence of the idiosyncratic shock. Thus increasing the persistence
of the aggregate shock is like shifting the distribution of ￿rr to the right; and increasing
the persistence of the idiosyncratic shock does the same for ￿ww. As the distributions
shift to the right, projection is more likely to happen so the mean of the distribution
falls further below its value at the RPE and the e⁄ects described in section 5.4 become
stronger. On the other hand, for lower values of persistence, projection is less likely to
happen so the distribution becomes more symmetrical with its mean closer to the value
at the RPE. Both these e⁄ect can be seen in table 7. The left-hand column sees a
smaller e⁄ect of learning, but one more linear in the gain. The right-hand column sees
a larger e⁄ect, but more non-linear in the gain.
5.7 An intercept in the learning rule
A number of recent papers (Milani, 2011, Eusepi and Preston, 2011) include an intercept
in the learning rule, interpreted as capturing households￿uncertainty about the steady
state. It is straightforward to augment the model of this paper with an intercept by






, (see the Appendix for
details). When this is done the restricted-perceptions equilibrium (which is unchanged)
remains e-stable and the convergence properties of the model are very similar.
However the addition of an intercept has signi￿cant e⁄ects on the properties of the
model - table 8 shows the moments for di⁄erent gains. Now at a gain of 0:001 consump-
tion and output are around 10% more volatile than at the RPE, in contrast to the model
without an intercept in which there was almost no ampli￿cation.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
To see why this happens, ￿rstly consider the steady state distribution of beliefs.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of beliefs about the intercept of the wage equation (the
distributions of the other components of beliefs are broadly similar to those shown in
￿gure 5). Note the high volatility of beliefs: this is a consequence, from (9), of the high
volatility of the idiosyncratic shock.
[FIGURE 8 HERE]
Why should uncertainty about the intercept translate into high volatility? To answer
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where the second term picks up the e⁄ect of the intercept, a discounted forward sum of
a constant. For the discount factor of the baseline calibration, 1
1￿(1+r)￿1 ￿ 100 which, if
the persistence of income is 0:9 is around 10 times higher than the coe¢ cient on income.
So variations in ￿1 are greatly ampli￿ed21. This happens to such an extent that for
values of the gain greater than 0:005 , the economy becomes unstable so no values are
reported.
Why does this lead to instability? Imagine a household learning a large positive
value for the constant. This means their consumption increases dramatically, which
will increase aggregate consumption. Other things equal, higher aggregate consumption
means lower aggregate capital and lower aggregate labour supply, so the return to capital
and the wage increase and in the next period which will increase ￿1 further; and hence
consumption still further leading to instability.22 Such instability is more of a problem
in a heterogeneous agent economy than in one with identical agents since the higher
volatility of idiosyncratic shocks is translated into wider distributions of beliefs so a
higher probability of a draw leading to instability. It also arises only if households are
very forward looking - in models that take the "Euler equation learning" approach (for
example Milani, 2011, which uses an intercept) it is not an issue.
While using a low gain, as in Eusepi and Preston (2011) avoids this problem, it
seems informational implausible for two reasons. Firstly, a gain of 0:001 implies that
households place around half as much weight on data two centuries old as they do on new
information23. Secondly, as shown in section 5.1, with a gain of 0:001 the economy takes
many thousands of periods to converge to the RPE - so starting the economy from the
steady state distribution is equivalent to endowing households with the very knowledge
they are supposed to be learning.
6 Discussion
This paper has taken a model in which agents have limited information, both about the
structure of the economy and the variables relevant to their decisions. Despite this, the
economy is shown to converge quickly to an equilibrium which is similar to the equilibrium
with model-consistent expectations. Learning does not introduce strong dynamics at the
21This also explains the strong e⁄ect of updating beliefs present in Eusepi and Preston (2011) but
absent from the impulse response of this paper - a small change in the element of ￿ relating to the
intercept has a massively ampli￿ed e⁄ect on consumption.
22Clearly this will only lead to instability of the aggregate economy if households are su¢ ciently large,
however even with 20;000 households the economy shows instability with gains much above 0:005 and
computational constraints prevent more households being used.
23The weight on information ￿ periods old is ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿.
28aggregate level, though more interesting things happen at a household level. Another
way of putting this is, at least in the context of this model, assumptions about information
are important for aggregates; assumptions about the ability of households to form model-
consistent expectations less so.
One strength of the approach taken in this paper is that the informational assumptions
are clear. Households￿information sets are constrained by the markets in which they
trade and they use all the information at their disposal to make optimal decisions. They
have no other knowledge either of the structure of the aggregate economy or of the values
of aggregate variables.
On the one hand, as pointed out in Graham and Wright (2010) the assumption of
market-consistent information is itself a strong one - households clearly have many other
sources of information than factor prices - but adding such information (for example
a noisy signal of output) would only further reduce the impact of learning. On the
other hand, section 5.7 showed that if an intercept is added to the learning rule, learning
can have a bigger e⁄ect on the properties of the economy. However this comes at the
cost of instability unless the gain is small, and although plausible, the addition of an
intercept seems arbitrary. This is related to a point made by Grandmont (1998) on
the speci￿cation of perceived laws of motion. What variables should be included in
them? What econometric speci￿cations should be used? Such choices would be far
more complicated if the model included features such as non-linearity, structural breaks
or non-ergodic shocks.
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Figure 1: Response of consumption to a positive aggregate technology shock
at the RPE
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33Figure 2: Convergence in the RBC model with learning over 10,000 periods





























x-axis shows number of periods; y-axis the deviation of the autoregressive component of the
PLM from its value at the MCEE. Line is mean value. 95% of values lie within the shaded
area.




x-axis shows number of periods; y-axis the deviation of the element of the PLM from its value
at the RPE. Line is mean value of element. 95% of values lie within the shaded area.
35Figure 4: Convergence of the economy with constant gain learning, ￿ww
Gain = 0:001 Gain = 0:005
Gain = 0:01 Gain = 0:05
x-axis shows number of periods; y-axis the deviation of the element of the PLM from its value
at the RPE. Line is mean value of element. 95% of values lie within the shaded area.
36Figure 5: Steady state distribution of beliefs
￿ww ￿wr































































37Figure 6: A simple example: impulse responses of consumption with
di⁄erent beliefs
















38Figure 7: Impulse response functions to a unit innovation in the process for
aggregate technology
Consumption Labour




























































































40Table 1: The perceived law of motion at the RPE
Wage equation
l wt￿1 rt￿1 wt￿2 rt￿2 wt￿3 rt￿3 wt￿4 rt￿4 wt￿5 rt￿5
1 0:9034 ￿0:8506
2 0:9026 ￿0:6324 0:0009 ￿0:2171
3 0:9026 ￿0:6270 0:0001 ￿0:0201 0:0008 ￿0:2012
4 0:9025 ￿0:6223 0:0001 ￿0:0197 0:0001 ￿0:0186 0:0008 ￿0:1865
5 0:9025 ￿0:6181 0:0001 ￿0:0193 0:0001 ￿0:0182 0:0001 ￿0:0173 0:0008 ￿0:1730
1 0:9025 -0:5846 0:0001 ￿0:0171 0:0001 ￿0:0158 0:0001 ￿0:0147 0:0001 ￿0:0137
Return equation
l wt￿1 rt￿1 wt￿2 rt￿2 wt￿3 rt￿3 wt￿4 rt￿4 wt￿5 rt￿5
1 ￿0:0002 0:9443
2 ￿0:0001 0:9330 ￿0:0000 0:0113
3 ￿0:0001 0:9327 ￿0:0000 0:0010 ￿0:0000 0:0105
4 ￿0:0001 0:9324 ￿0:0000 0:0010 ￿0:0000 0:0010 ￿0:0000 0:0097
5 ￿0:0001 0:9322 ￿0:0000 0:0010 ￿0:0000 0:0010 ￿0:0000 0:0009 ￿0:0000 0:0090
1 ￿0:0001 0:9305 ￿0:0000 0:0009 ￿0:0000 0:0008 ￿0:0000 0:0008 ￿0:0000 0:0007
41Table 2: Volatility of economy at the restricted-perceptions equilibrium
l y c n x a
1 2:491 1:575 0:998 7:702 1:605
2 2:483 1:571 0:995 7:683 1:605
3 2:476 1:566 0:992 7:667 1:605
4 2:469 1:562 0:990 7:657 1:605
5 2:463 1:558 0:988 7:648 1:605
MCEE 2:406 1:547 0:985 7:5900 1:605
42Table 3: The stationary distribution of the autoregressive component of
beliefs
￿ww ￿rr
Gain Mean StdDev Skewness
RPE 0:903 0 0
0:001 0:902 0:010 ￿0:154
0:002 0:901 0:014 ￿0:244
0:005 0:900 0:022 ￿0:389
0:01 0:890 0:032 ￿0:523
0:02 0:877 0:047 ￿0:651
0:05 0:839 0:077 ￿0:805
Gain Mean StdDev Skewness
RPE 0:945 0 0
0:001 0:944 0:006 ￿0:011
0:002 0:942 0:008 ￿0:025
0:005 0:935 0:020 ￿0:062
0:01 0:918 0:034 ￿0:156
0:02 0:902 0:037 ￿0:312
0:05 0:877 0:058 ￿0:645
Table 4: Ratio of standard deviation of aggregates with constant gain
learning to that at the RPE
Gain y c n x Projection
0:001 1:001 1:000 1:000 1:001 0:00%
0:002 1:002 1:001 1:001 1:002 0:00%
0:005 1:003 1:003 1:003 1:003 0:02%
0:01 1:003 1:005 1:004 1:004 0:16%
0:02 0:984 0:989 0:990 0:986 0:62%
0:05 0:975 0:984 0:986 0:976 3:04%
43Table 5: Ratio of standard deviation of household consumption growth rates









Table 6: Ratio of standard deviation of consumption with constant gain
learning, ￿ = 0:01 to that at the RPE, ￿c=￿RPE
c , sensitivity to number of
households
N 50 100 500 1;000 10;000
￿c=￿RPE
c 2:341 1:874 1:123 1:005 1:005
44Table 7: Ratio of standard deviation of aggregate consumption with
constant gain learning to that at the RPE
Sensitivity to persistence of aggregate shock
Gain=￿a 0:8 0:9 0:95
0:001 1:000 1:000 1:000
0:002 1:000 1:001 1:004
0:005 1:001 1:003 1:006
0:01 1:002 1:005 0:992
0:02 0:998 0:989 0:971
0:05 0:991 0:984 0:951
Sensitivity to persistence of idiosyncratic shock
Gain=￿z 0:8 0:9 0:95
0:001 1:000 1:000 1:000
0:002 1:001 1:001 1:008
0:005 1:003 1:003 1:008
0:01 1:004 1:005 0:994
0:02 1:000 0:989 0:978
0:05 0:997 0:984 0:961
Table 8: An intercept in the learning rule, ratio of standard deviation of
aggregates with constant gain learning to that at the RPE
Gain y c n x
0:001 1:102 1:081 1:104 1:091
0:002 1:231 1:149 1:221 1:183
0:005 1:841 1:493 1:739 1:621
45A Derivations
In what follows, all of the section except A.3 are from the modeler￿ s perspective i.e.
no agent in the economy would be able to perform the calculations involved. This




Using the de￿nition of an aggregate quantity (8) along with the adding up constraint
(14) allows the household-level relations to be easily aggregated.
The labour supply relation (2) aggregates to
nt = & (wt ￿ ct) (A.1)
where & = 1￿N
N ￿. The capital evolution equation (3)
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + ￿xt (A.2)









xt = ￿(wt + nt) + (1 ￿ ￿)(rkt + kt) (A.3)
The production function (5) - using the capital market clearing condition that total
household capital equals total ￿rm capital
yt = at + ￿nt + (1 ￿ ￿)kt (A.4)
and the factor demand conditions (6) and (7)
rkt = (1 ￿ ￿)
k
y
(yt ￿ kt) (A.5)
wt = yt ￿ nt (A.6)
A.1.2 The capital evolution equation
This follows Campbell (1994). Substituting (A.2) into (A.3) gives
kt+1 = ~ ￿1kt + ~ ￿2 [at + nt] + ~ ￿4ct (A.7)
46where
~ ￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿) +
y
k




￿[at + nt] (A.9)




Then substituting for labour from (A.1) and for the wage from (A.24) gives
kt+1 = ￿1kt + ￿2at + ￿4ct (A.11)
where
￿1 = ￿1 +
￿2& (1 ￿ ￿)











￿4 ￿ ￿2& +
￿2&2 (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)&
￿
(A.14)
A.1.3 An expression for the wage





t + ￿(nt ￿ n
s
t) + (1 ￿ ￿)(kt ￿ j
s
t) (A.15)





t) ￿ (kt ￿ j
s
t)) (A.16)





t + nt ￿ n
s
t (A.17)
Subtracting (7) from its aggregate equivalent (A.6) gives
w
s
t ￿ wt = (yt ￿ y
s






t = wt + z
s
t (A.19)
A.2 Market clearing prices
Combining the aggregate production function (A.4) with the aggregate labour demand
relation (A.6) gives
wt = ￿at + (￿ ￿ 1)nt + (1 ￿ ￿)kt (A.20)
47Substituting the aggregate labour supply relation (A.1) gives
wt =
￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)&ct + (1 ￿ ￿)kt





1 + & (1 ￿ ￿)
[&￿at + & (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ &ct] (A.22)
= ￿ (￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ ct) (A.23)
Then substituting this into the aggregate labour demand relation (A.6) gives
wt =
￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)&ct + (1 ￿ ￿)kt
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)&
(A.24)




t = ￿at ￿ ￿kt + ￿nt (A.25)
and using (A.22) gives
r
k
t = ￿(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1)kt + ￿(1 + ￿￿)at ￿ ￿￿ct (A.26)




where ￿2 = rk
r .
A.3 Optimal household consumption

































































































































































t + ￿5rt) + (￿cwTw + ￿crTr)￿￿














Given the PLM (21) and de￿ning matrices Tw and Tr to pick the respective prices out of




























t + ￿5rt) + (￿cwTw + ￿crTr)￿￿





A.4 State space representation


































(note this is written to allow an



























































































































50Then (A.39) can be written








































Then using (10) and (11) to substitute for lagged prices gives































(#wl￿wc + #rl￿rc) (A.53)
Since consumption depends on lagged states and on lagged consumption, the true state
vector will contain the full history of the current state vector Yt. However there are two
special cases
1. If l = 1 (A.50) does not depend on lagged consumption.
2. If labour supply is ￿xed ￿ = 1, & = 0 so aggregate prices (10) and (11) do not
depend on consumption and hence (A.50) does not depend on lagged consumption.
This proves Proposition 1
Write
ct = ￿cx (￿t)Xt (A.54)
where the state vector is given by Xt =
h
Yt Yt￿1 Yt￿2 :::: Y0
i0
and ￿t is the stack
of a households￿PLMs ￿
s
t
51Using (A.54), (A.50) can be written


































= ￿kX (￿t)Xt (A.58)
and stack this on top of the processes for the shocks to get the law of motion for Xt
Xt =
2
6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6
4
￿kX (￿t￿1) 0
￿a 0 0 0
0 ￿z 0 0
0 0 ::: 0




7 7 7 7 7








= ￿XX (￿t￿1)Xt￿1 + ￿XWWt￿1 (A.60)







Finally write the observables in terms of the states using (11), (10) and (A.54)
wt =
1
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)&
nh
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0
i
Yt + (1 ￿ ￿)&ct
o
(A.61)




1 + (1 ￿ ￿)&
nh





= ￿rX (￿t)Xt (A.64)






































6 6 6 6
6 6
4
1 0 0 ::: 0
0 1 1 ::: 0
1 0 0 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
3




Then using (A.62) and (A.64) can write
2
6


































= ￿IX (￿t)Xt (A.69)
So the system in state space form is given by this relation and the state evolution equation
(A.60).
A.5 Learning
This section follows Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) - their Appendix, pp302 - 303 is
particularly relevant. Conditions for convergence of ￿t to an equilibrium ￿ are found be
de￿ning an associated ordinary di⁄erential equation (ODE)
d￿
d￿
= h(￿);where h(￿) = lim
t!1EH(￿;Xt) (A.70)
The economy with learning will converge to ￿ only if ￿ is a locally stable ￿xed point of
the associated ODE.
53An updating rule for the PLM can be written generally as
￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿tH(￿t;It) (A.71)
Note that this is no more than a stack of the individual updating rules. At the restricted
perceptions equilibrium, all households are identical so simplify things by taking a single
household, so ￿t = ￿t, the stacked aggregate PLM is the same as the PLM of the single
household in the economy



































Substitute for prices in the expression for R using (A.68) to obtain
















In the expression for R, ￿st substitute for prices using (A.68) to obtain


































































































t!1ER = ￿IX (￿)MX￿IX (￿)
0 (A.77)
























subject to a budget constraint
bt+1 = (1 + r)bt + yt ￿ ct (B.2)
where yt is an exogenous process
yt = ￿yt￿1 + "t (B.3)
and the innovation is drawn from N (0;￿).
Let the household have belief ￿t about the persistence of the income process, so
~ Etyt+i = ￿
i
t yt (B.4)
Note in the case of model-consistent expectations ￿t = ￿
The ￿rst-order condition for consumption is
ct = Etct+1 (B.5)
and, using the transversality condition lim
t!1
1





(1 + r)bt +
1




Let beliefs be updated according to a simple constant gain algorithm
￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿ (yt ￿ ￿tyt￿1) (B.7)
























55B.1 Proof of proposition 1
Starting from ￿0 = ￿, in response to an innovation "0 beliefs in period 1 are ￿1 = ￿+￿"0
and then are revised back towards the MCEE i.e. ￿t > ￿ 8t > 2: Since f0 (￿) > 0 this
implies c > c￿ for a number of initial periods then c < c￿ for the rest of history. If
we de￿ne the impulse response of consumption as a function IRF then the standard







Since ￿0 = ￿ = ￿
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